interest in avoiding interpretive inconsistency. The model emphasizes an institutional difference between agencies and courts that the extant literature has generally neglected:
Agency decisions tend to be ideologically consistent across issues but variable over time, while court decisions tend to be ideologically heterogeneous across issues but stable over time. For the legislator, then, delegation to agencies purchases inter-temporal risk diversification and inter-issue consistency at the price of inter-temporal inconsistency and a lack of risk diversification across issues, while delegation to courts involves the opposite trade-off. From this basic insight the model derives an array of comparative statics regarding the conditions under which rational legislators would tend to prefer delegating to agencies over courts and vice versa. These results imply hypotheses as to how real-world variation in political and policy-specific variables, as well as variation in characteristics of judicial and agency approaches to statutory interpretation, may affect legislators' preferences regarding allocation of interpretive authority.
Agency decisions tend to be ideologically consistent across issues but variable over time, while court decisions tend to be ideologically heterogeneous across issues but stable over time. From this proposition the model derives an array of comparative statics regarding the conditions under which rational legislators would tend to prefer delegating to agencies over courts and vice versa. These results include the following: First, the model's assumptions straightforwardly imply that, all else equal, a legislator will prefer courts when she is concerned with interpretive consistency across time, but will prefer agencies when she is concerned with ideological consistency across issues or jurisdictions. Second, legislators who care about the long term tend to prefer delegation to agencies, while legislators with short time horizons are more likely to prefer delegation to courts. Third, a legislator who attaches roughly similar importance to a large number of interpretive issues will tend to prefer courts, while a legislator who views only a handful of issues as really critical is more inclined toward agencies. Fourth, delegation to agencies is less attractive if the policies agencies pursue vary dramatically over time, but is more attractive if judicial decisions are highly unpredictable across issues. These results imply hypotheses as to how real-world variation in political and policy-specific variables, as well as variation in characteristics of judicial and agency approaches to statutory interpretation, may affect rational legislators' preferences regarding allocation of interpretive authority.
I. THE PUZZLE AND THE EXTANT LITERATURE
The question "Why do legislators delegate?" and the closely related question, "Why do legislators draft ambiguous statutes?" are the subject of a rich literature.
Suggested explanations include the need to leave technical questions to experts, 3 politicians' desire to duck blame for unpopular choices 4 or to create new opportunities for constituency service, 5 the inability of multimember legislatures to reach stable consensus, 6 and the impossibility (or excessive cost) of anticipating and resolving all relevant implementation issues in advance. 7 This paper addresses a closely related but distinct question: "Given that legislators have an interest in delegation, to whom would they prefer to delegate?" More specifically, under what conditions will legislators prefer delegation to administrative agencies rather than courts? The answer to this question has important implications for both the positive study of legislative behavior and the normative evaluation of legal doctrine.
The legislative choice between agencies and courts has occasionally been the subject of overt and vigorous congressional deliberation. For example, one of the most important points of contention in debates over the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act was whether the Act should be enforced by the courts or by a commission. 8 Likewise, the debates that preceded enactment of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA) were fundamentally about how to allocate decision-making power between agencies and agencies, some scholars have also suggested that legislative delegation to independent courts can be explained by courts' superior fact-finding abilities. See James R. Rogers, Information and Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 84 (2001 WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 46-49, 71 (1977) . 6 The instability of collective legislative choice has been invoked to explain both delegation to agencies, see David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 432 (2002) , and delegation to courts, see Salzberger, supra note 4 at 366-68. however. This work emphasizes four factors: (1) the relative expertise of the potential decision-makers (agencies and courts); (2) the preference divergence (or "slack") between the legislator and the potential decision-makers; (3) the opportunities for manipulating voters' attribution of credit and blame for policy outcomes; and (4) the relative variation and uncertainty associated with agency and court decisions. The focus of this paper is on this fourth factor, which has received less attention than the other three. I discuss expertise, slack, and credit/blame manipulation theories briefly to provide context. I then turn to a more extensive discussion of the most influential uncertainty-management theories. I wish to make clear at the outset that I do not view these various theories as mutually exclusive, and I am agnostic as to their relative significance. My focus in this paper on variance and uncertainty is meant as an incremental contribution to a larger research agenda that takes all these factors into account.
Expertise. Perhaps the most common explanation for why a legislator would prefer delegation to an agency rather than a court is that agencies have specialized expertise and better access to relevant information, and therefore are more likely to "get it right" than courts. 23 The role of uncertainty in the legislative choice between agencies and courts has received less attention than other dimensions of this choice. The most important prior work on this factor -and the work to which this paper owes the greatest intellectual debt -are the contributions of Morris Fiorina. 37 In his seminal paper on legislative choice between legal process and administrative process, Fiorina recognized that because "implementation of a regulatory decision is itself a highly uncertain process," 38 a legislator's attitude toward risk coupled with the shape of the relevant probability distributions over outcomes affects her choice between judicial and administrative implementation of regulatory statutes. 39 Fiorina's preliminary analysis of the impact of uncertainty was problematic in two respects, however. First, while he treated delegation to an agency as a lottery, he treated delegation to courts as yielding a definite result.
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Second, his substantive conclusions regarding the effects of uncertainty on legislative preferences depended critically on the unconventional assumption of a "bell-shaped" legislative utility function in which the legislator is risk averse if the expected outcome is close to her ideal point but risk acceptant if it is far away. 41 Critics immediately pointed out that this assumption is non-standard and hard to justify on substantive grounds.
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In a subsequent paper, Fiorina abandoned the notion of bell-shaped utility functions and allowed delegation to courts to entail uncertainty. 43 At the same time, though, he adopted other non-standard and controversial assumptions. First, he assumed legislator utility functions are asymmetric: While each legislator is always risk averse, she is more risk averse if the expected outcome is to the left of her ideal point than if it is to the right (or vice versa). 44 Second, he restricted the probability density function of judicial decisions to be symmetric about the median legislator's ideal point and restricted the probability density function of agency decisions to be strictly increasing or decreasing, with an expected outcome unequal to the median legislator's ideal point. touched on only indirectly in the legal literature, turns out to have interesting implications for legislative preferences regarding allocation of interpretive authority.
II. ANALYSIS

The Model
Consider a single rational legislator who intends to vote on a statute containing ambiguous provisions. 50 The legislator may be aware of some of these ambiguities, but unmodeled exogenous factors make greater statutory specificity undesirable or impractical. The legislator also recognizes that unanticipated issues will arise and that she will care about how they are resolved. Because the legislator is assumed to prefer delegation to the status quo, she asks not, "Should I delegate?" but rather, "To whom simplicity I assume that the interpretive characteristics of agencies and courts are exogenous, fixed, and known. Thus, the legislator makes a binary choice between two options: (1) pass the statute and delegate interpretation of ambiguous provisions to the court; or (2) pass the statute and delegate interpretation of ambiguous provisions to the agency.
The legislator cares about how each issue is resolved in each time period the statute is in effect. Denote the legislator's substantive dissatisfaction with the resolution of issue n at time t by x nt ≥ 0, where x nt = 0 means the resolution of issue n at time t corresponds to the legislator's ideal, and higher values of x nt indicate worse outcomes.
The expected value of each x nt when the legislator delegates to decision-maker j ∈ A,C (where A denotes "Agency" and C denotes "Court") is µ j ≥ 0. The statute remains in effect for an infinite number of periods indexed by t = {0, 1, 2,…, ∞}, and the legislator discounts each x nt by factor δ t , δ ∈ (0, 1). (This assumption is also consistent with a statute of finite but indefinite duration, as δ t incorporates the probability that the statute ends by period t.) The statute contains an infinite number of ambiguous provisions indexed by n = {0, 1, 2,…, ∞}. The legislator does not view these ambiguities as equally significant, however. To capture the legislator's differential weighting of different issues, I assume she discounts each x nt by factor α n , α ∈ (0, 1). In other words, the various issues are indexed by n in descending order of importance, and the ratio of the weights assigned to issue i and the next-most-important issue i+1 is a constant, 1/α. When α is close to 1, many issues have roughly equal importance; when α is low, the salience of less important issues drops off much more sharply. While the functional form for inter- T is uncorrelated with δ and that λ N is uncorrelated with α. In other words, I assume the importance the legislator attaches to the substantive resolution of issue n in future periods is unrelated to how much the legislator cares that all decisions rendered on issue n are consistent over time, and that the difference between the importance the legislator attaches to each issue and the next-most-important issue has no impact on the legislator's desire that both of these issues be resolved consistently. I recognize, however, that in some cases these assumptions may not hold, and I note this possibility so that the reader may keep it in mind when interpreting my subsequent analysis and discussion.
The legislator's utility function exhibits declining marginal benefits from favorable outcomes -in other words, the legislator is risk averse. Adopting the arbitrary but conventional (and convenient) assumption of a quadratic utility function, we can write the legislator's expected utility from delegating to decision-maker j as the negative square of her total expected dissatisfaction (taking into account both substantive and consistency interests): 
Comparative Statics
Several intuitive conclusions follow immediately from Equation (4). First, the desirability (from the legislator's perspective) of delegating to the agency rather than the court increases with the expected policy loss from judicial interpretation (µ C ) and decreases with the expected policy loss from agency interpretation (µ A ). Substantively, this difference-in-means effect might reflect differences in expertise or differences in the expected "slack" of each agent. Therefore, though the subsequent analysis and discussion does not focus on expertise and slack variables, they are implicitly incorporated through these parameters.
Second, the legislator's interest in agency delegation is increasing in the legislator's interest in resolving different issues in an ideologically consistent manner (λ N ), while delegating to a court is more appealing the more the legislator cares about maintaining a consistent interpretive position over time (λ T ). This, of course, follows straightforwardly from the assumption that agency decisions are more consistent across issues and judicial decisions are more consistent across time.
Third, the legislator's preference for agency delegation is decreasing in the variance associated with agency decisions (σ A ). 56 While this may seem obvious, note that 56 The first-order conditions are A straightforward but important observation related to this difference-in-variance effect is that it can outweigh a difference-in-means effect that cuts the other way. For example, a difference-in-means effect favoring the agency (µ C >µ A ) -due, perhaps, to the agency's greater expertise or political responsiveness -can be overcome by a risk aversion effect if the variance of agency decisions (σ A ) is sufficiently large relative to the variance of judicial decisions (σ C ). An inconsistency-avoidance effect can also lead a rational legislator to prefer delegating to a court even if the difference-in-means effect favors the agency, so long as the legislator's taste for inter-temporal consistency is sufficiently strong (λ T high) and her aversion to inter-issue ideological inconsistency is sufficiently weak (λ N low). This observation suggests that an exclusive focus on differences in means -a focus implicit in some versions of expertise and slack minimization theories -may lead to incorrect predictions concerning legislative preferences.
The fourth basic comparative static result is that lengthening the shadow of the future (δ) makes agency delegation relatively more desirable. This effect arises for two reasons. First, the advantages of diversifying inter-temporal risk, which the agency does more effectively than the court, are greater when future periods are heavily weighted.
Second, a high inter-temporal discount parameter means the legislator cares more about the inter-issue inconsistency costs that are realized in future periods. Due to the parallel functional forms, these results are directly applicable to inter-issue discounting (α).
Heavy discounting of less important issues (α low) makes delegation to courts relatively less appealing because (1) the legislative interest in inter-issue risk diversification is weaker; and (2) the legislator doesn't care much about inter-temporal consistency for the less important issues.
The next comparative statics concern the inter-temporal correlation between agency decisions ( ) and the inter-issue correlation between court decisions ( ).
Increases in the correlation of agency decisions across time, which can be thought of as increases in agency inertia, make agency delegation more attractive if, but only if, 
Equation (7) is more likely to be satisfied if the legislator places a high value on intertemporal consistency (λ T high), when the legislator discounts the future heavily (δ low), and when the expected loss from judicial decisions is substantial (µ C high). These qualitative results parallel the results for increasing the inter-temporal consistency of agency decisions ( ). Similarly, allowing greater ideological variance between agency decisions within a given time period (decreasing ) increases the appeal of agency delegation if: 
III. DISCUSSION
I consider five sets of variables that may influence legislative preferences for agency or court delegation: (1) the nature of the substantive policy problem; (2) legislators' political incentives, including interest group pressure; (3) characteristics of judicial statutory interpretation; (4) characteristics of agency statutory interpretation; and (5) characteristics of judicial review of agency action. Within each category, the discussion suggests some preliminary hypotheses as to how the institutional characteristics of agencies and courts captured in the formal analysis might influence legislative preferences. I defer to future research development a more comprehensive theory that synthesizes expertise, slack minimization, and blame deflection/credit claiming along with variance and uncertainty, and that incorporates a richer, more nuanced understanding of institutional differences between agencies and courts.
The nature of the regulatory problem
Legislative preferences regarding the choice between agencies and courts will be influenced by characteristics of the substantive issue that the statutory scheme is meant to address. While there are many possible ways the underlying policy issue might affect legislative preferences, three seem particularly salient: (1) the relative importance of inter-issue and inter-temporal consistency in a specific context; (2) whether the statute addresses a long-term or short-term problem; and (3) whether addressing this problem requires resolving a handful of very important interpretive issues or instead requires addressing many interpretive questions of roughly similar importance. A closely related question is (4) whether the scope of delegated authority is broad or narrow. 58 Where costs of inter-issue or inter-jurisdictional inconsistency are low, however, the heterogeneity of court decisions may be an advantage rather than a disadvantage because it diversifies inter-issue or inter-jurisdiction risk.
Consistency interests. The legislative interest in inter-temporal consistency (λ
The shadow of the future. Regulatory policy areas differ not only with respect to the strength of the legislative interests in inter-temporal and inter-issue consistency, but also with respect to how long-lived the issues are likely to be. Many statutes deal with issues that are likely to persist for a long time -air pollution, labor relations, abortion policy, financial regulation, etc. Other statutes are targeted more short-term problems, like allocating emergency aid to airlines in the wake of the 9/11 attacks 59 or determining liability for the costs of addressing the "millennium bug." 60 Whether a particular individual or organization qualifies for a license or regulatory exemption is also likely to be an issue with short-term rather than long-term significance, unless the decision has a substantial precedential effect or the potential licensee is an important, long-lived player in the relevant market. Because a legislator's interest in how issues are resolved in future periods (δ) correlates positively with her preference for agency delegation, she is more likely to prefer agency delegation for statutes that address long-lived issues than for those that deal with short-term problems.
The number of important issues. Some regulatory policy areas may involve only a handful of really important questions. This could be because only a few of the applications of the statute implicate salient political conflicts, or because the elaboration of a small number of rules will govern a large number of specific cases that arise under the statute. 61 Such policy areas may be characterized, in the model's terms, as ones in which less important issues are heavily discounted (α low), which implies a preference for delegation to agencies rather than courts. 62 By contrast, statutes that require application of general standards to the facts of particular cases on a more individualized basis -for example, anti-fraud laws 63 or licensing schemes that that involve application of a subjective standard like "public interest" 64 -would tend to favor delegation to courts because they implicate a relatively larger number of discrete interpretive issues of roughly comparable importance.
The scope of delegation. The degree to which the legislator discounts future periods (δ) and less important issues (α) are influenced not only by the nature of the policy area but also by the scope of the delegation. For example, legislators may discount future periods more substantially for a statute with a sunset provision that for a statute of indefinite duration, making the former associated with delegation to courts and the latter with delegation to agencies. 65 Similarly, a statute that delegates narrow authority to resolve a few specific issues might be characterized as one in which less important issues are heavily discounted (α low), while a statute that delegates broad policy-making power might imply a large number of issues that have roughly similar 61 See Louis Kaplow, Rules and Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 573, 622 (1992) .
62 When α is low, the difference in importance between issues is greater than when α is high, and the importance of lower-ranked issues approaches zero very rapidly. 63 See Kaplow, supra note 61 at 618-19. 64 See, e.g., Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. §303. 65 For a more general discussion of how sunset clauses and related provisions influence legislative incentives, see Jacob Gersen, "Temporary Legislation" (2005) [manuscript on file with author].
importance (α high). This suggests, all else equal, that legislators are more likely to favor court delegation when a statute delegates broadly, while narrow delegations lend themselves to a preference for agency delegation. This prediction, however, is subject to an important qualification: Though the model treats the discount parameters as exogenous, the scope of delegation is largely a legislative choice. I defer this endogeneity complication to future research.
Summary. The legislative interest in delegating to agencies is likely to be particularly strong when a statute requires resolving a relatively small number of issues with long-term significance, especially when inter-temporal consistency is not very important. Statutes in which Congress delegates the formulation of a few basic rules that can be applied more or less mechanically to a large number of cases would fit these criteria. Legislators are more likely to prefer delegation to courts when a statute delegates the resolution of a large number of issues (which cannot be significantly reduced by promulgating a few simple rules), each of which has relatively short-term significance. The model's predictions are less clear for statutes that delegate broad authority over many important, long-lived issues, or those that delegate a decision on a small number of short-lived issues.
Incentives of legislators and their constituents
Legislators' incentives are shaped not only by the nature of the substantive policy issue, but also by their institutional position and electoral constraints. Consider two such factors: (1) whether legislators and/or influential interest groups have narrow, parochial interests or broad, encompassing interests; and (2) whether legislators and interest groups have short or long time horizons.
Encompassing v. narrow interests.
Legislators may perceive the relative difference in importance between issues as high (α low) even when a statute delegates a large number of questions that would appear similarly important to an "objective" observer. For example, legislators may focus only on the subset of statutory provisions that directly affect their districts. And in some contexts, the dynamics of political organizing favor groups with narrow, specific interests over groups with broader interests. 66 If, for these or other reasons, legislators substantially discount less important issues, they will tend to support delegating to agencies instead of courts. Interestingly, this may be the case even if many legislators with different narrow interests must form an alliance to pass a statute. Each legislator might rank issues in a different order of
importance, yet because each of them perceives a relatively high difference between the importance of the most important issue and that of the next-most-important issue, all have a shared interest in delegating to an agency. Doing so diversifies inter-temporal risk on the handful of issues or jurisdictions each legislator really cares about. 67 In other circumstances, legislators might care about a broad array of issues and jurisdictions. This is likely if legislators are motivated by ideological goals rather than constituency-service goals or if national parties impose discipline. And, while many interest groups are structured around specific narrow issues, other groups -for example, the Business Roundtable or Public Citizen -care about a multitude of statutes and statutory provisions.
Because these legislators and interest groups assign relatively high importance to lots of issues (α high), they have a stronger interest in delegating to courts, which can diversity their inter-issue risk more effectively.
Short-term v. long-term perspective. Different legislators and interest groups may
assign different values to future periods not only because of the nature of the longevity of the underlying policy issue, but also because of political or institutional considerations.
66 See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982) ; MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1972) . 67 It is plausible, though, that the factors that make legislators and interest groups focus on a small number of issues may also tend to make legislators less concerned about inter-issue ideological consistency. This would tend to make agency delegation less attractive. See supra note 54.
If legislators care more about getting good results while they are still in office, then a legislator whose expected duration in office is shorter -perhaps because she is at the end of her legislative career or because her district is hotly contested -will discount the future more heavily (δ low). Such a legislator will prefer delegation to courts more than a similarly-situated legislator with a longer time horizon. This implies the potentially intriguing result that a stronger incumbency advantage correlates positively with legislative support for agency delegation. One may make a similar set of observations regarding the time horizons of interest groups. Long-lived groups -including the major political parties, to the extent that they pursue a substantive agenda in addition to seeking office -have a relatively stronger interest in agency delegation than do temporary, makeshift groups.
Summary. All else equal, the model predicts that secure legislators with narrow, parochial interests will tend to favor agency delegation, as will long-lived interest groups that care about a narrow set of issues, i.e. single-firm/single-industry lobbyists or singleissue advocacy groups. For these actors, inter-temporal risk diversification is more important than inter-issue risk diversification, and maintaining inter-issue consistency in future time periods is more important than maintaining inter-temporal consistency on plethora of unimportant issues. The preferences of large, broad-based advocacy groups are more ambiguous because such groups care about lots of issues (α high) and care a great deal about the future (δ high). Likewise, it is hard to make predictions about the preferences of senior party leaders or other legislators who are both politically secure and relatively more focused on broad national and/or ideological interests.
If, as a general matter, individual legislators and interest groups tend to have long time horizons and narrow, parochial interests, then the analysis suggests a tendency of the political system to produce delegation to agencies rather than courts. The normative conclusions one should draw from this observation, if it proves accurate, are unclear. If the narrow focus of secure legislators and institutionalized interest groups is viewed as a pathology to be resisted, the amount of agency delegation in the current system may be excessive. A more sanguine view sees benefits to a system in which legislators and interest groups can diversify inter-temporal risks on the issues they care most about.
While I take no position on this normative question, the preceding analysis is relevant to the ongoing debate about whether courts or other institutions ought to adopt rules that discourage broad delegations to administrative agencies.
Characteristics of judicial statutory interpretation
Consider three characteristics of the judiciary that might affect its appeal to legislators: (1) ideological diversity on the bench; (2) the degree to which the Supreme Court exercises centralized control; and (3) the strength of the stare decisis norm.
Judicial diversity. In the context of the model, increasing the ideological diversity of the courts has two effects. First, if an increase in "diversity" changes the proportional representation of different ideological views on the bench, it will shift the expected dissatisfaction with judicial interpretation (µ C ). Whether this development makes delegation to courts more or less attractive to a given legislator (i.e., whether µ C decreases or increases) depends on the correspondence between that legislator's preferences and those of the new "diversity-enhancing" judges. Second, increasing diversity increases the ideological variance of judicial interpretations (σ C ). Because this exacerbates inter-temporal risk costs and increases the amount of inter-issue inconsistency, it makes delegation to courts less appealing. An increase in judicial diversity therefore makes a legislator more inclined to delegate to agencies, unless the increase in diversity shifts the expected outcomes of court decisions sufficiently closer to the legislator's ideal that the change-in-mean effect outweighs the increase-in-variance effect. Viewed in this light, legislators see ideological diversity on the bench as, at best, a cost they may have to tolerate if they want to shift expected judicial outcomes closer to their ideal. itself, relaxation of stare decisis in statutory interpretation cases is also likely to make delegation to courts more appealing to rational legislators.
Characteristics of agency statutory interpretation
Consider three institutional/contextual characteristics of agencies that shape the probability distribution associated with agency decision-making: (1) whether the agency is an executive branch agency or an independent commission; (2) the degree of centralized presidential oversight; and (3) the amount of political polarization, i.e.
ideological divergence between the main political competitors on the relevant issues. When these assumptions do not hold, executive branch agencies bear a stronger resemblance to independent commissions as described in the preceding subsection.
Mechanisms that strengthen centralized presidential control -for example, regulatory review by the Office of Management and Budget or expanded use of presidential directive authority 78 -will tend to increase the ideological consistency of agency decisions within a given time period ( ) and decrease the stability of agency decisions over time ( ). This would make agency delegation more attractive to legislators who value inter-temporal risk diversification and inter-issue consistency, but less attractive to legislators who value inter-issue risk diversification and inter-temporal consistency. variance is likely to be lower, making agency delegation more attractive. An important qualification: The same underlying political polarization that increases the variance of agency decisions (σ A ) may also increase the variance of judicial decisions (σ C ). Thus, a more accurate statement of the hypothesis is that agency delegation is less likely on issues where politicians have sharply divergent views but courts are less divided.
Summary.
Legislators who care about inter-temporal risk diversification and inter-issue consistency, but not inter-issue risk diversification or inter-temporal consistency, are more partial to executive agencies subject to centralized presidential control. By contrast, legislators interested in inter-issue risk diversification and intertemporal consistency are more likely to favor agency delegation if the agency operates with some degree of autonomy from the President. In general, rational legislators are less 78 See Kagan, supra note 29 at 2277-90. 79 To clarify, I assume here that polarization does not affect the location of the ideological mid-point between the two parties, i.e. increased polarization does not affect µ A .
likely to favor agency delegation when executive branch agencies must make decisions on policy controversies that polarize political parties much more than they do judges.
Judicial review of agency decisions
To this point, the discussion, like the model, has assumed that if Congress delegates interpretive authority to an agency, the court plays no role. The justification for this simplifying assumption is that, under prevailing Chevron doctrine, courts are quite deferential to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, 80 as well as to other agency exercises of delegated power. 81 But courts do review agency decisions, sometimes aggressively, 82 and the extent and nature of judicial review can vary across time and across issues. While the model does not explicitly incorporate judicial review of agency decisions, it suggests two ways such review might alter the legislator's calculus. First, aggressive substantive judicial review of agency decisions -a tendency of the court to "substitute its judgment for that of the agency" 83 -will reduce any difference between judicial and agency interpretation. In the presence of such aggressive review, the choice between agencies and courts is not much of a choice at all, and most of the other substantive hypotheses developed from inspection of the model would cease to hold.
Second, judicial review of agency action might stress procedure rather than substance.
That is, the court might eschew evaluation of the agency's substantive choice, but would
force the agency to demonstrate "reasoned decisionmaking." 84 If such a requirement makes policy change more costly, it will increase the inter-temporal consistency of agency decisions ( ). Judicial review of this sort would increase the appeal of delegating to agencies if inter-temporal consistency is more important than inter-temporal risk-diversification, but would make agency delegation less attractive if risk diversification is the more salient concern. A similar effect obtains if courts treat divergence from longstanding agency practice as a reason to give agency interpretations less deference. 
CONCLUSION
Legislators who delegate their authority must pick the agent to whom they will delegate, thereby choosing which policy lottery they will enter. One of the most basic decisions a legislator must make in this regard is whether to delegate to an administrative agency or to the courts. This paper explores some of the factors that may influence this choice, focusing in particular on a rational, risk-averse legislator's interests in maintaining ideological consistency and diversifying ideological risks. The formal model explores the implications of this trade-off, and also focuses attention on the fact that the legislator confronts this trade-off on two dimensions, across issues and across time. The analysis highlights the importance of institutional features of American courts and administrative agencies that extant scholarship has tended to overlook: Court decisions exhibit more stability over time but more ideological heterogeneity across issues, whereas agency decisions are more ideologically consistent within a given time period but more likely to vary across time. Though simple and stylized, a formal model incorporating these features generates a number of hypotheses regarding the conditions under which legislators are likely to prefer agency delegation to court delegation and vice versa.
The analysis presented here is preliminary and exploratory. I have chosen to focus on one particular dimension of the legislative choice. A more comprehensive theory would have to integrate other explanatory variables -including expertise, slack, and credit and blame shifts -as well as other institutional features of the policy-making process like legislative oversight. This paper should therefore be read as a contribution to a larger project, not as a brief advocating the primacy of one set of explanatory variables.
That said, the influences on legislative preferences I analyze in this paper have generally been overlooked, and they have potential significance for both positive theories of legislative choice and normative theories that rely, explicitly or implicitly, on some such positive theory.
